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Abstract
We study the problem of designing efﬁcient auc-
tions where bidders have interdependent values;
i.e., values that depend on the signals of other
agents. We consider a contingent bid model in
which agents can explicitly condition the value of
their bids on the bids submitted by others. In par-
ticular, we adopt a linear contingent bidding model
for single minded combinatorial auctions (CAs), in
which submitted bids are linear combinations of
bids received from others. We extend the exist-
ing state of the art, by identifying constraints on
the interesting bundles and contingency weights re-
ported by the agents which allow the efﬁcient sec-
ond priced, ﬁxed point bids auction to be imple-
mented in single minded CAs. Moreover, for do-
mains in which the required single crossing con-
dition fails (which characterizes when efﬁcient, IC
auctionsarepossible), wedesignatwo-stagemech-
anism in which a subset of agents (“experts”) are
allocated ﬁrst, using their reports to allocate the re-
maining items to the other agents.
1 Introduction
Auction design is an important topic of research in artiﬁcial
intelligence. Auctions involve the allocation of a set of re-
sources among strategic agents, each of which has a private
signal regarding the value of a subset of the resources being
sold. In this paper, we consider settings in which the bidders’
valuations are interdependent, i.e. they depend not only on
their own signal, but also on the signals of other agents.
Such auctions often occur in practice. Consider, for exam-
ple, the allocation of the right to show a series of ad impres-
sions to consumers in online advertising. Several advertisers
have different signals about the likelihood of these consumers
clicking on these slots and following through their clicks with
purchases. In this setting, the value of an advertiser for ob-
taining a set of impressions may also depend on the signals
of other bidders. This is because some advertisers may have
data on the likelihood users will convert the impressions into
purchases, thus are “experts”, while others are “novices”.
The aim of this work is to study such auctions in combina-
torial settings with single minded bidders (=desiring exactly
one bundle of items) and placing contingent bids. In contin-
gent bid auctions, agents are not required to describe others’
signals, but are only asked to submit conditional bids of the
form: “If Agent 1 bids $x for bundle B1, then I will bid $y
forbundleB2”. Forthis setting, Dasgupta and Maskin[2000]
design an efﬁcient auction, in which allocation is computed
based on the ﬁxed point of the vector of bids. They also
show this auction can be implemented in an ex-post equi-
librium, subject to the agent’s valuations satisfying single
crossing condition (SCC). However, Dasgupta and Maskin
do not provide practical instantiations of valuation domains
that satisfy SCC. Yet, we argue that describing actual nego-
tiation domains is a crucial step in order to apply these im-
portance insights in practice. Towards this end, the work of
Ito and Parkes [2006] (which our work builds on), provides
an instantiation of Dasgupta and Maskin’s model, by identi-
fying a linear valuation model in which the ﬁxed point con-
vergence and single crossing conditions are satisﬁed. How-
ever, the results in Ito and Parkes allow the implementation
of the efﬁcient auction only in the single item case. For sin-
gle minded combinatorial auctions (CAs), they propose an
alternative method using greedy allocation, which is truthful,
but not efﬁcient. The main contribution of this work is to ﬁll
this gap, and describe domains in which the efﬁcient auction
proposed by Dasgupta and Maskin [2000] can be truthfully
implemented in single minded combinatorial domains.
In more detail, our analysis will consider both combina-
torial settings (where exactly one copy is available of each
item) and combinatorial multi-item settings (involving mul-
tiple copies of some of the items). We derive constraints on
the linear contingency weights and the structure of bundles
demanded, such that the required single crossing condition
holds and, thus, the efﬁcient allocation can be truthfully im-
plemented. In the second part of the paper, we consider do-
mains in which the single crossing condition fails, due to the
fact that a large number of bidders have values contingent on
the private signals of a few “expert” bidders. For this setting,we provide an alternative to the greedy method discussed in
Ito and Parkes [2006], that aims to exploit the structure of in-
terdependencies between the agents. Speciﬁcally, we propose
a two-stage mechanism that involves pre-allocating the expert
agents in the ﬁrst stage, followed by an efﬁcient allocation for
the remaining agents. The paper concludes with a discussion.
2 Related work
There have been several works that consider interdepen-
dent valuations, reporting both positive and negative re-
sults. For single-dimensional signals, where the private in-
formation of a bidder can be captured by a single number,
ex post efﬁcient auctions exist (Dasgupta and Maskin [2000];
Krishna [2009]). For multi-dimensional signals, there are
strong negative results about the ability to truthfully im-
plement efﬁcient outcomes (Dasgupta and Maskin [2000];
Jehiel and Moldovanu [2001]).
Other works have considered interdependent value auc-
tions in more speciﬁc settings. One proposed alternative is
todesignmechanismswherevaluesarecontingentdirectlyon
the signals (an approach taken in previous work of Dash et al.
[2005]; Ito et al. [2004], among others), in which each agent
explicitly is asked to provide a valuation function based on all
signals. However, such approaches assume domain knowl-
edge, such as a common language to describe the private sig-
nals advertisers have about ad impressions.
The work of Ito et al. [2004] consider settings with a spe-
cial structure, in which agents are either “experts” (agents
whose signals inﬂuences others) or “amateurs” (who fol-
low other agents’ signals). An alternative class of interde-
pendent value auctions are the so-called execution contin-
gent mechanisms (Ceppi et al. [2011]; Klein et al. [2008];
Mezzetti [2004]). In these mechanisms, the payments are
computed in the second stage, after the values are revealed
to the agents by the allocation and thus they circumvent the
problem of the single crossing condition. However, these
two-stage mechanisms have weak incentives in the second
stage, and thus have limited applicability.
3 Preliminaries
Denote by M the set of items to be allocated, and N the set
of agents (bidders) for these items, where m = jMj and
n = jNj are the sizes of these sets (unless otherwise spec-
iﬁed, set M may include multiple copies of the same item).
A single minded bidder has an interesting (or useful) bundle
Wi  M, and moreover we use ki = jWij to denote the sizes
of the useful bundles. Each agent’s value is described by an
interdependent function zi(X;s)  0 on bundles X  M,
deﬁned in terms of signals s = (s1;:::;sn) as:
zi(X;s) =
(
zi(s); if X  Wi
0; otherwise
(1)
We assume free disposal, that is the agent’s value is (weakly)
increasing with additional goods. Function zi(s)  0 deﬁnes
the agent’s value for an interesting bundle, given signals s.
In this work, we use the linear contingent bids model, as
ﬁrst deﬁned in Ito and Parkes [2006]. For combinatorial do-
mains, the model can be deﬁned as follows. Each agent
i 2 N reports an interesting bundle ^ Wi (potentially untruth-
fully), a stand alone value v0
i , and a set of weight bundle pairs
f(i;1;Xi;1):::(i;n;Xi;n)g for all agents j 6= i, where
i;j 2 R0 and Xi;j  M . Taken together, this deﬁnes
the following contingent value function:
vi(X;v i) =
(
v
0
i +
P
j6=i i;jvj(Xi;j;v j) for X  ^ Wi
0 otherwise
(2)
Where vi(X;v i) denotes agent i’s value for bundle X, de-
terminedinaﬁxedpoint, w.r.t. thevaluesofotheragents. The
private value v0
i of each agent is a weakly increasing function
of its signal (i.e. @v0
i =@si  0). However, because in this
paper we only work with valuations and don’t model signal
spaces explicitly, we can assume wlog. v0
i = si.
In order for an allocation to be computable in this inter-
dependent value setting, a key requirement is that the set of
valuations converge to a single ﬁxed point in RN
0. Formally,
the valuation equilibrium point is deﬁned as a ﬁxed point of
the mapping (v1;:::vn) 7! (v1(v 1);:::vn(v n)), where
vi(v i) : 2M 7! R0.
Theorem 1 (Ito and Parkes [2006]) A single minded con-
tingent bid domain has a unique ﬁxed point if
P
j6=i i;j < 1,
for all i 2 N.
Note that the existence of a unique ﬁxed point is fully deter-
mined by the contingency weights i;j, and not by the useful
bundles Wi that agents demand. Thus, as long as the condi-
tion in Theorem 1 holds, the contingent bid system will con-
verge to a ﬁxed point, regardless of the Wi.
The condition in Theorem 1 is sufﬁcient for convergence,
but is not also necessary. A tight condition can be derived
using determinants of the valuation vectors, which is however
difﬁcult to interpret, the condition in Theorem 1 being more
useful for this work. In the remainder of this section and in
Section 4 we will only focus on domains which satisfy the
property in Theorem 1, thus for all results going forward a
unique ﬁxed point of the valuations exists.
3.1 An Efﬁcient Contingent Bids Auction
In an interdependent value auction, each agent is required to
place a contingent bid function bi(X;b i), which takes the
same form as the value function in Equation 2, and is evalu-
ated by the auction in an analogous way. A bid bi is truthful
iff it is truthful for all parts of the report (i.e. contingency
weights i;j, private value v0
i and interesting bundle Wi).
For the contingent bidding model, Dasgupta and Maskin
[2000] propose an efﬁcient auction that can be general-
ized to the multi-item case as follows: (1) Compute the
ﬁxed point bids ~ bfp, as deﬁned by the mapping induced
by Equation 2 (but using the space of reported bids); (2)
Compute the efﬁcient allocation X = (X
1;:::;X
n) =
argmaxX2 
P
i2N b
fp
i (Xi) to maximize total value (break-
ing ties at random), where   denotes the set of feasible allo-
cations; and (3) computes the payment to each winner i as:
min b
0
i
s.t. b
0
i +
X
j6=i
b

j(X

j )  maxX2 
X
j6=i
b

j(Xj) (3)
where b
j(X) = bj(X;(~ b0
i;b
 i;j)), and~ b0
i(X) = b0
i for X 
^ Wi and 0 otherwise. Here b
 i denotes the new ﬁxed point inthe bid space if agent i would bid b0
i for its interesting bundle
^ Wi; the intuition being that agent i pays the smallest amount
it could have bid and still won, also accounting for the effect
of its report on the bids of other agents.
In order for truthful bidding to be an ex-post Nash equilib-
rium in this efﬁcient auction, the agent’s valuation functions
must satisfy the property of Generalized Single Crossing
Condition (Generalized SCC) Dasgupta and Maskin [2000]).
Deﬁnition 1 (Generalized SCC) If, for signals (s1;:::;sn)
there is a pair of allocations X and X0, tied for
value, i.e.:
P
j2N zj(Xj;s) =
P
j2N zj(X0
j;s) =
maxX002 
P
j2N zj(X
00
j ;s) then for every agent i such that
Xi 6= X0
i, we require:

@
@si
zi(Xi;s) >
@
@si
zi(X
0
i;s)

()

@
@si
X
j2N
zj(Xj;s) >
@
@si
X
j2N
zj(X
0
j;s)
 (4)
Intuitively explained, for any two allocations X and X0 tied
for (maximal) value, generalized SCC requires that, when-
ever the value of agent i for X is improving more quickly
than for X0 with respect to its signal, this is also true for the
total social welfare of all agents. Conceptually, this is true
when the marginal effect of an agent’s signal on its own value
dominates the marginal effect of its signal on the aggregate
economy of agents. The link between truthful implementa-
tion in CAs and generalized SCC is given by Theorem 21:
Theorem 2 (Dasgupta and Maskin, Ito and Parkes [2006])
Given an valuation domain with an expressive bidding lan-
guage, the second-price interdependent value single minded
CA auction is efﬁcient in an ex post Nash equilibrium iff the
generalized SCC property holds.
Note the theorem requires a preference language expres-
sive enough for the preference domain and, importantly, it
only holds for single dimensional signal spaces (which in a
CA domain means single minded bidders). But given these
assumptions, the theorem guarantees efﬁcient and truthful
implementation, as long as generalized SCC holds in the
value domain. The focus of Section 4 is on deriving con-
straints on the weights in the linear contingency model, which
assure generalized SCC holds in single minded, combinato-
rial domains. In the case of a single item auction, the follow-
ing condition is known to be sufﬁcient for truthfulness:
Theorem 3 (Ito and Parkes [2006]) The second price, in-
terdependent value, single item auction (i.e. jMj = 1), satis-
ﬁesSCCandistruthfulwhenever
P
j6=i i;j < 1, for8i 2 N.
For single minded CAs this condition is sufﬁcient for as-
suring we have ﬁxed point bids (cf. Theorem 1), but not for
generalized SCC. To see this, consider the example shown in
Figure 1, with the contingent valuations:
v1(AB;v 1) = 5 + 0:5v2(C);v2(C;v 2) = 6
1The SCC deﬁnition in the initial paper Dasgupta and Maskin
[2000] is too strong to be useful in combinatorial domains. This
form of the Generalized SCC condition is cited in Ito and Parkes to
personal communication with Eric Maskin in October 2005.
0.5
0.7
0.5 0.7
V1({A,B}) V4({A})
V3({A,B,C}) 0.2
V2({C})
V5({B,C})
Figure 1: Example showing failure of Generalized SCC
v3(ABC;v 3) = 7 + 0:5v1(ABC) + 0:2v2(AC)
v4(A;v 4) = v5(BC;v 5) = 1 + 0:7v1(AB).
If all the bidders place truthful bids (with bi = vi;8i 2 N),
then ﬁxed point in the bid space would be: b1(AB) =
8;b2(c) = 6;b3(ABC) = 12:2;b4(A) = 6:6;b5(BC) =
6:6. The mechanism allocates: X1 = fABg;X2 =
fCg;X3 = X4 = X5 = ;. Now, suppose an own value
v0
1 = 8, which means:
v1(AB;v 1) = 8 + 0:5v2(C)
Then, the truthful ﬁxed point bids would be b1(AB) =
11;b2(c) = 6;b3(ABC) = 13:7;b4(A) = 8:7;b5(BC) =
8:7. In this case, allocation would be X0
4 = fAg;X0
5 =
fBCg. But then, bidder 1 could easily misreport any ^ v0
1 < 7
and be allocated instead. The reason is that SCC is broken
here for agent 1 and allocations X = hfABg;fCg;;;;;;i
and X0 = h;;;;;;fAg;fBCgi. This is because the signal
of agent 1 (s1 = v0
1) has a greater marginal inﬂuence on the
value of the opposing coalition A4;A5 than on A1;A2.
4 Domains with efﬁcient allocation
In this section, we study which restrictions on the contin-
gency weights or interesting bundle structure demanded by
each agent ensure truthful implementation of the efﬁcient
auction presented in Section 3.1 in a combinatorial domain.
Similar to Ito and Parkes [2006], our aim is to identify pref-
erence domains deﬁned by universal, anonymous, restrictions
on the total contingency weights reported by each agent.
For all the domains we explore, convergence to a unique
ﬁxed point is assured by the property in Theorem 1, so in this
section we focus on conditions which guarantee that General-
ized SCC holds. First, for the proofs we require an additional
lemma, which characterizes domains in which the total con-
tingency weight of each agent is bounded by a threshold.
Lemma 1 (Threshold Property) Consider a setting with N
agents whose values are interdependent on each other, let  2
(0;1) be some ﬁxed threshold. Then, if for all agents 8i 2 N
it holds that
P
j2N i;j <  this implies that 8j;i 2 N:
@zj
@si
<  , for all j 6= i
where zj = zj(X) (for some X  Wi) is the value function
of agent j and si is the private signal of agent i.
Intuitively, what the property says is that if all the total
weights speciﬁed by any agent is less than , then the total
cumulative dependency of the value of any agent on any other
must be less than .
Proof 1 The proof is by induction on the maximum degree
of the derivative @zj=@si. First, we use the assumption that
@zi=@si = 1 for 8i 2 N (this follows from our setup in whichsi = v0
i , the value of an agent w.r.t. its own private signal).
For j 6= i the derivative will be a sum of products of p;l
terms, depending on the derivation paths from j to i.
Denote by D
(k)
zj=si the n-th degree derivative of zi w.r.t. si,
and by R(Dzj=si) the maximum rank of this derivative, when
it become a constant. Formally, R(Dzj=si) = k iff
@zj
@(k)si >
0 and
@zj
@(k+1)si = 0. Intuitively, this means the maximum
derivation path from j to i has exactly k iterations. The proof
then follows two steps.
Initialization step: For R(Dzj=si) = 1, we know:
@zj
@si
= j;i
@zi
@si
= j;i <
X
p2N
j;p < 
Induction step: Assuming the property holds for all 8p 2
N for which R(Dzp=si)  k, we show it also holds for all
j 2 N for which R(Dzj=si) = k + 1:
@zj
@si
= j;i
@zi
@si
+
X
p6=i;R(Dzp=si)k
j;p
@zp
@si
Since we know, by construction @zi
@si = 1 and
@zp
@si <  < 1
this means:
@zj
@si
< j;i +
X
p6=i
j;p =
X
p2N
j;p < 
Thus, if the property also holds for any agent p 2 N with
R(Dzj=si)  k, it also holds for all agents j 2 N for which
R(Dzj=si) = k + 1.
Intuitively, if some agent j’s value is contingent on the
value of other agent(s) k 6= j;i whose value is, in turn, con-
tingent on si, this cannot lead to a stronger contingency of zj
on si than if that contingency was expressed directly. Given
this linear contingency model, we are ready to characterize
CA domains that satisfy Generalized SCC.
Theorem 4 In a preference domain in which, for all agents
8i 2 N itholdsthat
P
j2N i;j < ki
m (whereki = jWij;m =
jMj), then Generalized SCC holds.
Proof 2 The proof starts from the generalized SCC condition
from Def. 1. Assume, by contradiction, that SCC is violated
() 9i 2 N and 9 two efﬁcient allocations X;X0 s.t.:
@
@si
zi(Xi;s) >
@
@si
zi(X
0
i;s);but :
@
@si
X
j2N
zj(Xj;s) <
@
@si
X
j2N
zj(X
0
j;s) (4)
In a single minded bidder model, the ﬁrst equation must
mean that: Wi  Xi, but Wi * X0
i (i.e. agent i is allo-
cated its useful bundle by allocation X, but not by X0). Now,
consider the agents that are allocated their useful bundles
by allocation X0, and let us denote their set by Sopp (this
is the potential “opposing”’ coalition to agent i being allo-
cated). Formally, Sopp = fj 2 N;s.t. Wj  X0
jg (necessar-
ily i = 2 Sopp). We can restrict the 2nd term of Eq. 2 as:
@
@si
X
j2N
zj(X
0
j;s) =
@
@si
X
j2Sopp
zj(X
0
j;s)
This is because, by deﬁnition, agents j = 2 Sopp do not de-
rive any value from allocation X0 (as they are not allocated
their useful bundle by X0). Since there are at most m items
available for allocation:
P
j2Sopp kj  m. Moreover, we
have that @zi
@si = 1 and because our starting condition and
Lemma 1, for 8j 6= i the following holds:
@zj
@si <
kj
m. This
means that we get the following inequality:
X
j2Sopp
@
@si
zj(X
0
j;s) <
X
j2Sopp
kj
m
< 1
But, for the allocation X (in which agent i is allocated,
i.e. Wi  Xi), we must have that: @
@si
P
j2N zj(Xj;s) 
1, because at least agent i is allocated by X, which gives a
contradiction with the assumption in Equation 2.
Note that the bound provided by Theorem 4 gives a tight
condition on all agents. Even if the condition fails for one
agent but holds for all the others, Generalized SCC can still
fail. Consider the the example illustrated in Figure 1, with
the same agents and values. If the contingency weights from
Agents 4 and 5 are 4;1 = 0:33 (under the threshold of 1=3
given by Theorem 4), but 5;1 = 0:68 (above the threshold
of 2=3), the condition fails for only one agent (Agent 5). Yet
Generalized SCC still fails for Agent 1.
4.1 Domains with subset/superset constraints
One way to relax the bound on the contingency weights is
to impose additional structure on the bundles agents demand,
such as having values contingent only on agents whose useful
bundles are subsets or supersets of their own. In order for
such constraints to work, however, in this section we restrict
the analysis only to single unit combinatorial domains, where
there is only one unit of each type of item. Hence, no item can
be replaced with another in any of the agents’ useful bundles.
Theorem 5 Consider a single unit combinatorial domain
with single minded bidders, in which agents specifying con-
tingent bids demand only bundles that are subsets, i.e.:
i;j > 0 =) Wi  Wj;8i 2 N. Generalized SCC holds if
8i;j 2 N: X
j2N
i;j <
ki
maxp2N kp
Proof 3 The proof follows the same structure as the proof of
Theorem 4. As before, consider two allocations X (in which
agent i is allocated its useful bundle) and X0 (in which it is
not). We work towards the same contradiction of generalized
SCC. As before, consider the set Sopp of opposing agents to
i, agents that are allocated by X0. Formally, we can deﬁne
Sopp as the set of agents j 2 N allocated by X0 for which
@zj(X0
j;s)
@si 6= 0 (for these agents j;i > 0 and Wj  X0
j).
Important to note that, necessarily, for 8j 2 Sopp;Wj *
Xj, because allocation X allocates agent i its target bundle,
and due to our assumptions that goods are single unit and
Wj  Wi, it cannot be that both agent i and any of the agents
j 2 Sopp are simultaneously allocated useful bundles. Thus,
the agents in the set Sopp should satisfy:
 8j 2 Sopp;Wj  Wi. This is due to our starting as-
sumption, as j;i > 0 for j 2 Sopp.
 8j;l 2 Sopp;Wj \ Wk = ;. This is because there is
a single unit of each good, and both j;l 2 Sopp areallocated their useful bundles by X0, which would not
be possible unless these bundles do not overlap.
This means that the useful bundles of agents j1;j2 :::jjSj 2
Sopp represent, at most a disjoint partition of Wi, meaning:
Wj1 [ Wj2 [ :::WjjSj  Wi
where any pair is mutually disjoint, i.e. Wjl \Wjl = ;. This
means
P
j2Sopp kj  ki. Due to Lemma 1, this means:
@zj(X
0
j;s)
@si
<
kj
maxp2N kp

kj
ki
Where the last relation is an equality if agent i is actually p,
and strict otherwise. This gives the set of inequalities:
X
j2Sopp
@zj(X
0
j;s)
@si
<
X
j2Sopp
kj
ki
<
P
j2Sopp kj
ki
< 1
The other efﬁcient allocation X (which allocates to i) has:
@
@si
P
j2N zj(Xj;s)  1 giving the required contradiction.
V4({A,B})
V3({A,C})
V1({A,B,C})
.33
.99
V2({A})
V6({B})
V5({C})
V7({A,B,C})
.16
.16
.66
.66
.16
.16
Figure 2: Example of a domain with subset constraints
In Figure 2 we show an example domain with subset con-
straints. Edge weights were assigned such that the sum of
dependencies from each agent is the maximal allowed in The-
orem 5 (decimals were rounded down). The total contingency
weight of A2, A2 and A6 (who demand 1 item each) must be
bounded by 1
3, as they together could form a potential SCC-
breaking coalition against A1. However, the weight restric-
tion of A7 on A1 is < 1, as this agent could not form a coali-
tion against A1 with any other agent. Example 1 shows why
this logic fails in a domain with multi-unit supply (i.e. why
the single unit assumption in Theorem 5 is needed).
Example 1 Consider an example with m = 12 identical
items, and n=4 agents: Agent 1 demanding k1 = 7 items
(with v0
1 = 4), Agent 2 demanding k2 = 1 item (with v0
1 = 4),
and Agents 3 and 4 demanding k3 = k4 = 6 items each. The
only 2 value interdependencies are from Agents 3 and 4 on
the value of agent 1: 3;1 = 6=7, 4;1 = 6=7 (recall that
they satisfy the condition that W3  W1 and W4  W1, as
they demand 6 items out of 7). In this case, agent 1 can mis-
report ^ v0
1 = 2 and be allocated, preventing the bids of 3 and
4 from forming a larger blocking coalition Sopp against it.
Next, we study the case of superset constraints.
Theorem 6 In a single-unit supply, combinatorial domain
with single minded bidders, if each agent is restricted to
specifying contingent demand bids that are supersets, i.e.
i;j > 0 =) Wi  Wj;8i 2 N, then Generalized SCC
holds if 8i;j 2 N;
P
j2N i;j < 1.
Proof 4 The proof follows the same structure as before, con-
sidering two allocations: X, in which agent i is allocated and
X0 in which it is not. Deﬁne Sopp as the set of agents j 2 N
allocated by X0 for which
@zj(X
0
j;s)
@si 6= 0. Due to the super-
set assumption, there exists at most one such agent, i.e. the
cardinality jSoppj = 1. This can be shown by contradiction.
Suppose there are 2 agents j;k 2 Sopp;j 6= k. We know that
9Wi;Wi 6= ; s. t. Wj  Wi and Wk  Wi. Since there is
only a single unit available of any item, X0 cannot allocate
both agents j and k simultaneously. Therefore, Sopp con-
tains a single agent (and it must contain at least one agent,
because we assumed agent i was allocated by X, but not by
X0, hence some other agent must have received i’s items in
X0). But from Lemma 1, we know that for 8j 2 Sopp;j 6= i,
@zj=@si < 1, hence: @
@si
P
j2N zj(X0
j;s) < 1 and AND
@
@si
P
j2N zj(Xj;s)  1, hence Generalized SCC holds.
V3({A,B})
V1({A})
V4({A,C})
V6({A,B,D})
V5({A,B,C})
.33
.33
.33
.99
.99
.99
.49
.49
V2({A,D)}
Figure 3: Example of a domain with superset constraints
Figure 3 shows an example with superset constraints, with
edge weights assigned such that the sum of dependencies by
each agent is the maximal one allowed in Theorem 6. Note
the value of agent A1 has a large inﬂuence on the values of
other bidders (5 times higher than on its own value). How-
ever, there is no problem with Generalized SCC, because all
the agents whose valuations depend (even indirectly) A1’s
value must have demands that include item A, thus they could
never be allocated simultaneously, as a coalition.
This is an interesting result, because it means the constraint
for domains with superset demand structure is the same as in
the single item case. By comparison, that for subset demands
the contingency weight limit needs to be lower for SCC to
hold. However, we believe superset type constraints are more
natural in practical applications.
5 A truthful auction between experts and
amateurs when Generalized SCC fails
In Section 4, we identiﬁed several domain restrictions which
ensure the Generalized SCC property holds, and the efﬁcient
auction can be implemented. These domain restrictions are
useful in applications where no bidder’s valuation has an
“outsize inﬂuence” on the rest of the market. Yet, in many
real-world settings, the opinion of a few expert agents can
drive valuations across the whole market. Real markets are
often divided into a few experts (who have an “inside signal”
regarding the true value of some items) and a large number
of “amateurs”. Although the efﬁcient auction from Section
3.1 cannot be applied, we can use the special structure of the
value contingencies between agents to develop a two-stage
auction tailored speciﬁcally for such cases. Informally, ﬁrst asmall number of expert agents are allocated their useful bun-
dle for a ﬁxed price (or, in our case, for free). Their reports
are then used to compute the ﬁxed point bids for the remain-
ing agents, who are allocated through the second-price, ﬁxed
point bid auction. Formally, ﬁrst deﬁne the inﬂuence score of
agent i as: In(i) =
P
j6=i j;i.
Consider the following mechanism which sets threshold
level  for the inﬂuence score2. Next, the set of available
items M is partitioned into two distinct sets: Mp (allocated
through the “expert pre-allocation stage”) and Ma (allocated
based on received bids). The “experts ﬁrst” mechanism has
two allocation stages (denoted by Xp and Xa):
1. Pre-allocation of expert agents: All agents i 2 N with
In(i) >  are allocated their useful bundle (X
p
i = Wi)
for free and leave the market. Here, we assume that Mp
is set large enough for all agents with In(i) >  to
be allocated, but any items in Mp not allocated remain
unsold (and unavailable for Stage 2).
2. Allocation based on received bids: Reports from all
agents i 2 N (including the ones pre-allocated in stage
1 that left the market) are used to allocate the remaining
Ma items, using the ﬁxed point valuations vi:
X
a =< X
a
1;:::;X
a
n >= argmax
X2 (Ma;N)
X
i2N
zi(Xi;s)
where  (Ma;N) denotes the set of possible ways to
allocate Ma items among N agents. It is possible that
an agent that has been pre-allocated in stage 1 is also
allocated by Xa (i.e. Xa
i = X
p
i = Wi). In this case, the
corresponding items remain unsold.
Theorem 7 The “experts ﬁrst” mechanism is truthful.
Proof(Sketch) First note that the inﬂuence score does not
depend on the agents’ own reports, only on the contingency
weights reported by other agents. Thus, no agent can unilat-
erally determine its “expert” status and allocation in Stage 1.
However, an agent can affect the score and ranking of other
pre-allocated agents, so the agents participating in Stage 2
must be indifferent which agents are pre-allocated in Stage 1.
This holds because, ﬁrst, the number of items Mp available
for pre-allocation is ﬁxed (any items left unused are unallo-
cated), thereisnowayforanagenttoincreasesupplyofitems
Ma available in Stage 2. Second, the competition agents face
in Stage 2 is the same, as it includes the bids from all agents
i 2 N, even if some were pre-allocated. Thus, both the
supply and the competition they face is the same, regardless
pre-allocations in Stage 1. And because the mechanism en-
sures all agents that potentially break SCC are pre-allocated
in Stage 1, these agents have no incentive to misreport.
Example 3: Consider an auctioneer who needs to sell 1000
identicalitems(e.g. 1000identicalbottlesofwine). Thereare
2 agents: A1 and A2 who demand 5 items each, with values
v1(W1 = 5) = $20, respectively v2(W2 = 5) = $50. More-
over, there are 101 agents Ac that demand 10 items each, but
their valuation being exclusively contingent on that of A1,
as: vc(Wc = 10) = 10  v1(Wc = 10) (i.e. c;i = 10),
and another 101 agents Ai that also demand 10 items each,
2A level of  = 1 is natural from the perspective of ensuring
SCC, though a higher level may be sufﬁcient as well.
with independent values vi(Wi = 10) = $10. Thus, in
this setting one agent (A1) can be thought of as a wine ex-
pert, and a lot of bidders are willing to buy larger quantities
and pay more contingent on her opinion. If all bidders are
truthful (which means the reported bid vectors are equal to
their values~ bi = ~ vi), then the ﬁxed point bids are b1 = $20,
b2 = $50, bi = $10 and bc = $200. In this case all 1000
items would be allocated to 100 of the bc bidders (breaking
ties at random), who pay $200 for 10 items. The social wel-
fare is then:
P
j2Njv1 vj = 100$200 = $20;000. However,
SCC is clearly broken here for A1 who can simply misre-
port ^ b1(W1 = 5) = $0:5, leading to the ﬁxed point bids:
b1 = $20, b2 = $50, bi = $10 and bc = $5, and the
mechanism would allocate 5 items each to A1, A2 and 10
items each to 99 of the Ai agents. This has a much lower
social welfare of
P
j2Nj^ v1 vj = $1040:5. Consider how this
example would work with pre-allocation, where Mp = 10
are reserved for pre-allocation and Ma = 990 can be allo-
cated using the ﬁxed point bids (with  = 1). In the pre-
allocation stage, only agent A1 with In(A1) = 990 > 1
is pre-allocated X
p
1 = 5 items for free, and 5 items remain
unsold. As A1 was already allocated, in Stage 2, the report
of A1 can be used to compute the truthful ﬁxed point bids:
b1 = $20, b2 = $50, bi = $10 and bc = $200. Then 99 of the
Ac agents are allocated 10 items each, giving a social welfare
of
P
j2N vj(Xp [ Xa) = 99  $200 + $20 = $19820.
Note that the above example is somewhat simpliﬁed, as
only one agent is an expert. In practice, e.g. in the wine do-
main, there may be several wine experts whose opinion large-
scale buyers (e.g. restaurants, merchants) follow. Then, more
items may need to be reserved for pre-allocation (e.g. 50 out
of 1000), but the intuition remains the same.
6 Conclusions
This paper advances the state of the art in interdependent
value auctions by deriving conditions under which the efﬁ-
cient contingent bid auction of Dasgupta and Maskin [2000]
can be implemented in combinatorial domains with single
minded bidders. Starting from the linear contingency model
of Ito and Parkes [2006], we identify domain restrictions on
the total weights and bundle structures which lead to prefer-
ence domains where generalized SCC is satisﬁed, and hence
the efﬁcient auction can be truthfully implemented. We com-
plement these results with a truthful two-stage allocation pro-
cedure for domains that do not satisfy Generalized SCC,
which involves ﬁrst pre-allocating to a set of experts, and us-
ing their reports to allocate efﬁciently the remaining items.
There are several issues that could be explored in future
work. Previously, Ito and Parkes [2006] proposed a truth-
ful auction for single minded CAs, which uses greedy allo-
cation, where the allocation decision is taken separately for
each item. While neither the greedy method, nor the “experts
ﬁrst” method in this paper guarantee efﬁciency, it would be
interesting to compare their average case performance in a
practical application, such as the keyword advertising auc-
tions in the introduction. Another relevant question for future
research is exploring interdependent value auctions in online
settings (such as in Constantin et al. [2007]; Gerding et al.
[2011]), where agents arrive in the market over time.References
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